Abstract

 


 



European Migration Policies: The Effect of Uncertainty


Michele Moretto


University of Padua - Department of Economics; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Sergio Vergalli


University of Brescia - Department of Economics; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan

June 20, 2012

Review of Environment, Energy and Economics (Re3), June 2012

Abstract:     
In our article we study how uncertainty affects migration choice and how networks are able to mitigate its effects. In particular, we describe a real option model where the migration choice depends on both the wage differential between the host country and the country of origin, and on a network of homogeneous immigrants. By looking at the labour market uncertainty, the optimal migration decision of an individual consists of waiting to migrate in a (coordinated) mass of individuals. By looking at policy uncertainty, we try to explain if it is better for the government to tighten or relax limits for immigrants in order to control migration inflows. Our results show that promoting uncertainty over migration limit may improve the government's control on migration inflows (quotas). In particular, we show that if the government controls the information related to the immigration stock it could delay the mass entry of immigrants, maintaining the required stock in the long run and controlling the flows in the short-run. Therefore, if the government's aim is to delay and/or control entry migration waves, it could control the uncertainty on the information related to the immigration quota.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: Immigration, Real Option, Quota

JEL Classification: J2, J61

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: June 23, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Moretto, Michele and Vergalli, Sergio, European Migration Policies: The Effect of Uncertainty (June 20, 2012). Review of Environment, Energy and Economics (Re3), June 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2089380

Contact Information

Michele Moretto
University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )
via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy
+39 049 8274265 (Phone)
+39 049 8274211 (Fax)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milan
Italy
Sergio Vergalli (Contact Author)
University of Brescia - Department of Economics ( email )
Via San Faustino 74B
Brescia, 25122
Italy
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan ( email )
Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milan
Italy
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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