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The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do European Companies List Abroad?

Marco Pagano
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ailsa Röell
Princeton University - Bendheim Center for Finance

Josef Zechner
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration


October 1999

EFA 0171

Abstract:     
This paper documents the aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies and analyzes both their distinctive pre-listing characteristics and their post-listing performance relative to other companies. In the 1986-97 interval, many European companies listed abroad, but did so mainly on US exchanges. At the same time, the number of US companies listed in Europe decreased. The cross-listings of European companies appear to have sharply different motivations and consequences depending on whether they cross-list in the United States or within Europe. In the first case, companies pursue a strategy of rapid expansion fuelled by high leverage before the listing and large equity issues after the listing. They rely increasingly on export markets both before and after the listing, and tend to belong to high-tech industries. In the second case, companies do not grow more than the control group, and increase their leverage after the cross-listing. Also, they fail to increase their foreign sales in the wake of the cross-listing. The only common features of the two groups are their large size, high foreign sales before cross-listing and high R&D spending after cross-listing.

JEL Classifications: G15, G30, G39

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 24, 2000 ; Last revised: July 27, 2000

Contact Information

Marco Pagano (Contact Author)
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Ailsa A. Röell
Princeton University - Bendheim Center for Finance ( email )
26 Prospect Avenue
Princeton, NJ 08540
United States
609-248-4033 (Phone)
609-258-6419 (Fax)
Josef Zechner
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
Augasse 2-6
Vienna A-1090, Wien A-1090
Austria
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