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Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?


Margaretha Buurman


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Josse Delfgaauw


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Robert Dur


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Seth Van den Bossche


TNO Quality of Life - Work and Employment

June 28, 2012

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3851

Abstract:     
We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale survey were offered a substantial reward and could choose between a widely redeemable gift certificate, a lottery ticket, or making a donation to a charity. Our analysis shows that public sector employees are significantly less likely to choose the risky option (lottery) and, at the start of their career, significantly more likely to choose the pro-social option (charity). However, when tenure increases, this difference in pro-social inclinations disappears and, later on, even reverses. Further, our results suggest that quite a few public sector employees do not contribute to charity because they feel that they already contribute enough to society at work for too little pay.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: public service motivation, risk aversion, revealed preferences data

JEL Classification: H100, J450, M520

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Date posted: June 30, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Buurman, Margaretha , Delfgaauw, Josse, Dur, Robert and Van den Bossche, Seth, Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic? (June 28, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3851. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094954

Contact Information

Margaretha Buurman
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3062PA
Netherlands
Josse Delfgaauw
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Robert Dur (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )
FEW / H 8-15
P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31-10-4082159 (Phone)
+31-10-4089161 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur
Tinbergen Institute
Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Seth Van den Bossche
TNO Quality of Life - Work and Employment ( email )
P.O. Box 718
AS Hoofddorp, 2130
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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