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Privatization: A Theoretical Framework


Vihang R. Errunza


McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Sumon C. Mazumdar


Law and Economics Consulting Group (LECG), LLC; University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

February 2000


Abstract:     
Recent empirical studies have documented the dramatic growth of privatizations globally and the resultant efficiency gains. We develop a theoretical model that incorporates the costs and benefits of privatization as complex options. This framework allows us to highlight the impact of government's overall public sector policies on the potential benefits of privatization, illustrate the manner in which a government's specific policies concerning the SOE before and after privatization affects its share price at privatization and examine the role of subsidies, tax shields and bankruptcy costs in determining the optimal leverage and investment choices made by the firm's management after privatization. It yields testable hypotheses and policy implications concerning the prioritization of SOE sales, public sector investment policies, tax subsidies, entry restrictions, and the state's use of monopoly power.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

JEL Classification: F3, G3, O2

working papers series


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Date posted: April 20, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Errunza, Vihang R. and Mazumdar, Sumon C., Privatization: A Theoretical Framework (February 2000). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=209569 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.209569

Contact Information

Vihang R. Errunza (Contact Author)
McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )
1001 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H3A1G5 H3A 2M1
Canada
514-398-4056 (Phone)
514-398-3876 (Fax)
Sumon C. Mazumdar
Law and Economics Consulting Group (LECG), LLC ( email )
2000 Powell Street, Suite 600
Emeryville, CA 94608
United States
510-450-5493 (Phone)
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business
Finance Department
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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