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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095714
 
 

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Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Terms


Ronald J. Gilson


Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Charles F. Sabel


Columbia University - Law School

Robert E. Scott


Columbia University - Law School

June 28, 2012

New York University Law Review, Forthcoming
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 424
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 429
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 193/2012

Abstract:     
In developing a contractual response to changes in the economic environment, parties choose the method by which their innovation will be adapted to the particulars of their context. These choices are driven centrally by the thickness of the relevant market and the uncertainty related to that market. In turn, the parties’ choice of method will shape how generalist courts can best support the parties’ innovation and the novel regimes they envision. In this essay, we argue that contractual innovation does not comes to courts incrementally, but instead reaches the courts later in the innovation’s evolution and more fully fledged than the standard picture contemplates. Highly stylized, the trajectory of innovation in contract we find is this: Private actors respond to exogenous shocks in their economic environment by changing existing structures or procedures to make them efficient under the new circumstances. The innovating parties stabilize their newly emergent practices through a variety of regimes, both bilateral and multilateral, whose goal is to establish the context through which the innovation is implemented. It is only at this point that courts step in when a dispute is presented to them. If contract innovation does indeed reach generalist courts through the mediating institution of these contextualizing regimes, then our argument follows directly: If a central goal of contract adjudication is to enforce the context the parties have provided, then the courts’ willingness to defer to the context the parties give them will put the law more directly in the service of innovation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

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Date posted: June 30, 2012 ; Last revised: October 2, 2013

Suggested Citation

Gilson, Ronald J. and Sabel, Charles F. and Scott, Robert E., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Terms (June 28, 2012). New York University Law Review, Forthcoming; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 424; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 429; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 193/2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095714 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2095714

Contact Information

Ronald J. Gilson (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0614 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-1655 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Charles F. Sabel
Columbia University - Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
Robert E. Scott
Columbia University - Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-0072 (Phone)
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