Repeated Nash Implementation
University of Warwick - Faculty of Social Studies
University of Essex - Department of Economics
June 29, 2012
This paper studies repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We introduce the condition of dynamic monotonicity and show that it is necessary for repeated implementation in finite as well as infinite horizon problems. With at least three agents, the conditions of dynamic monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. In infinite horizon problems with high enough discount factors, dynamic monotonicity implies weak efficiency in the range (Lee and Sabourian, 2011), while Maskin monotonicity implies dynamic monotonicity in finite horizon problems.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38
Keywords: Dynamic Monotonicity, Nash Implementation, Maskin Monotonicity, Repeated Implementation, Repeated Games
JEL Classification: C72, D71working papers series
Date posted: June 30, 2012
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