Abstract

 
 

References (18)



 


 



When are Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs Mutually Beneficial?


Richard C. Sansing


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; CentER, Tilburg University

Jeri K. Seidman


University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business

Lisa De Simone


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting

June 2, 2012

2012 AAA Annual Meeting - Tax Concurrent Sessions

Abstract:     
This study investigates the circumstances under which "enhanced relationship" tax compliance programs are mutually beneficial to taxpayers and tax authorities, as well as how these benefits are shared. We develop a model of tax authority and taxpayer behavior inside and outside of an enhanced relationship program. Our model suggests that, despite the adversarial nature of the relationship, an enhanced relationship program is mutually beneficial in many settings. The benefits are due to lower audit costs and the effect of taxpayer disclosures on the tax authority's audit strategy. We also identify settings in which the program is socially beneficial, but these benefits are not achieved because one party is unwilling to enter the program. Finally, we show that an increase in the ability of the tax authority to identify uncertain tax positions makes an enhanced relationship tax compliance program more attractive to both the taxpayer and the tax authority.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 2, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Sansing, Richard C., Seidman, Jeri K. and De Simone, Lisa, When are Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs Mutually Beneficial? (June 2, 2012). 2012 AAA Annual Meeting - Tax Concurrent Sessions. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097907 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2097907

Contact Information

Richard C. Sansing (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
100 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-0392 (Phone)
603-646-1308 (Fax)
CentER, Tilburg University ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Jeri K. Seidman
University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
Lisa De Simone
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 266
Downloads: 71
Download Rank: 167,944
References:  18

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.703 seconds