Abstract

 


 



Gender Differences in Experimental Wage Negotiations


Marcus Dittrich


Chemnitz University of Technology (CUT) - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Andreas Knabe


University of Magdeburg - Institute of Economics and Business Administration; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Kristina Leipold


Dresden University of Technology

June 29, 2012

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3862

Abstract:     
We examine behavioral gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with face-to-face alternating-offers wage bargaining. Our results suggest that male players are able to obtain better bargaining outcomes than female players. Male employees get higher wages than female employees. Male employers pay lower wages to female employees than female employers pay to male employees. Moreover, we find gender differences in the first offers of the bargaining game.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: gender differences, wage bargaining, labor market experiment

JEL Classification: C720, C910, J160

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Date posted: July 3, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Dittrich, Marcus, Knabe, Andreas and Leipold, Kristina, Gender Differences in Experimental Wage Negotiations (June 29, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3862. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2098874

Contact Information

Marcus Dittrich (Contact Author)
Chemnitz University of Technology (CUT) - Department of Economics ( email )
Chemnitz, 09107
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Andreas Knabe
University of Magdeburg - Institute of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
Universitaetsplatz 2
Magdeburg, 39016
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Kristina Leipold
Dresden University of Technology ( email )
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Dresden, 01062
Germany
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