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International Antitrust Institutions


Oliver Budzinski


Ilmenau University of Technology; University of Southern Denmark - Department of Environmental and Business Economics

July 4, 2012

Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers, Vol. 17, No. 72, July 2012

Abstract:     
The paper discusses the economic theory of international antitrust institutions. Economic theory shows that non-coordinated competition policies of regimes that are territorially smaller than the international markets on which business companies compete violate cross-border allocative efficiency and are deficient with respect to global welfare. At the same time, some diversity of antitrust institutions and policies promotes dynamic and evolutionary efficiency so that globally binding, worldwide homogenous competition rules do not represent a first-best solution either. After reviewing the existing international antitrust institutions and their prospects and limits from an economic perspective (with a focus on the International Competition Network, ICN), the paper discusses reform proposals from economic literature.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: international competition policy, international antitrust, International Competition Network, global governance, WTO, institutions, international organizations

JEL Classification: F02, F53, F55, K21, L40, D02

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Date posted: July 4, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Budzinski, Oliver, International Antitrust Institutions (July 4, 2012). Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers, Vol. 17, No. 72, July 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2100576

Contact Information

Oliver Budzinski (Contact Author)
Ilmenau University of Technology ( email )
Ilmenau, D-98684
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/wth
University of Southern Denmark - Department of Environmental and Business Economics ( email )
Niels Bohrs Vej 9-10
DK-6700 Esbjerg, 6700
Denmark
+45 6550 4159 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.sdu.dk/staff/obu.aspx
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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