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Intellectual Property & Antitrust Limitations on Contract


Bruce H. Kobayashi


George Mason University - School of Law

Michelle Burtis


LECG, LLC


DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND ANTITRUST ISSUES, J. Ellig, ed., Cambridge University Press, pp. 229-263, 2001
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-06

Abstract:     
In a consistent framework, both the antitrust and intellectual property laws should point toward the same goal: the maximization of social welfare. The attainment of this goal suggests that both sets of laws should be harmonized to attain this common goal and come to a joint solution with respect to the use/creation tradeoff. This paper examines the state of antitrust and intellectual property right protection for software, and finds little evidence that both sets of laws are being applied in a consistent manner. An examination of how the antitrust laws are applied to intellectual property industries finds little consideration of the unique appropriability and free riding problems that face intellectual property owners. As a result, antitrust enforcement has been hostile to intellectual property contracting and intellectual property industries, and to the maximization of dynamic efficiency. Further, static, ex-post competition arguments are now being used in support of weakening copyright protection. The outcome of this two-pronged attack is unlikely to yield a rational solution to the use/creation tradeoff.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

JEL Classification: K10, K21

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: May 10, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Burtis, Michelle, Intellectual Property & Antitrust Limitations on Contract. DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND ANTITRUST ISSUES, J. Ellig, ed., Cambridge University Press, pp. 229-263, 2001; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=210088 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.210088

Contact Information

Bruce H. Kobayashi (Contact Author)
George Mason University - School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8034 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~bkobayas
Michelle Burtis
LECG, LLC ( email )
1725 Eye Street, NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20006
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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