Governing Securities Class Actions
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
University of Georgia Law School
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, 2011
UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2101345
This short essay, written for a symposium on The Principles and Politics of Aggregate Litigation: CAFA, PSLRA, and Beyond, decouples due process from a proceduralist’s intuition and explains why it matters in securities class actions. It begins by exploring several analytical models that shed light on the representative relationship in class actions, including a public law analogy to the administrative state, a private law analogy to corporate law, and another, more modern public law analogy to political governance. After finding that the political-governance model best addresses both sources of inadequate representation in securities class actions — rifts between class members and class counsel, and between class members and their lead plaintiff — this Essay argues that incorporating qualified class members into securities class action governance will improve due process and legitimacy in securities litigation just as it does in the political sphere.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16
Date posted: July 5, 2012
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