Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101460
 
 

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The Clan and the City: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe


Avner Greif


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Guido Tabellini


University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo); Bocconi University - Department of Economics

July 5, 2012


Abstract:     
Over the last millennium, the clan and the city have been the locus of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines -- analytically, historically, and empirically -- the cultural, social, and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such groups impact institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Moral groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Cooperation, Moral Groups, China, Europe, Institutions, Development

JEL Classification: N00, O10, O50, P51, Z10

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Date posted: July 6, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Greif, Avner and Tabellini, Guido, The Clan and the City: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe (July 5, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101460 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2101460

Contact Information

Avner Greif (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-725-8936 (Phone)
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )
180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
Guido Tabellini
University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 3305 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 3302 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
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