Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101933
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



The Climate Policy Dilemma


Robert S. Pindyck


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 2012

NBER Working Paper No. w18205

Abstract:     
Climate policy poses a dilemma for environmental economists. The economic argument for stringent GHG abatement is far from clear. There is disagreement among both climate scientists and economists over the likelihood of alternative climate outcomes, over the nature and extent of the uncertainty over those outcomes, and over the framework that should be used to evaluate potential benefits from GHG abatement, including key policy parameters. I argue that the case for stringent abatement cannot be based on the kinds of modeling exercises that have permeated the literature, but instead must be based on the possibility of a catastrophic outcome. I discuss how an analysis that incorporates such an outcome might be conducted.

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Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

working papers series


Date posted: July 7, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Pindyck, Robert S., The Climate Policy Dilemma (July 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w18205. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101933

Contact Information

Robert S. Pindyck (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
50 Memorial Drive, E52-450
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6641 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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