Cash is King - Revaluation of Targets after Merger Bids
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Marcus M. Opp
University of California, Berkeley - Finance Group
New York University (NYU)
NBER Working Paper No. w18211
We provide evidence that a significant fraction of the returns to merger announcements reflects target revaluation rather than the causal effect of the merger. In a sample of unsuccessful merger bids from 1980 to 2008, targets of cash offers are revalued by +15% after deal failure, whereas stock targets revert to their pre-announcement levels. This result holds for the subsample where deal failure is exogenous to the target's stand-alone value. We also show that cash bidders revert to their pre-announcement levels, while stock bidders fall below. The results suggest that cash bids signal target undervaluation and stock bids indicate acquirer overvaluation.
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 60working papers series
Date posted: July 7, 2012
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