Elevation Adaptation: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court
Ryan C. Black
Michigan State University - Department of Political Science
Ryan J. Owens
University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science
July 7, 2012
7th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
We examine whether federal circuit court judges alter their behavior when vacancies open up on the United States Supreme Court so that they might get noticed by the president and nominated to the high court. Using matching methods, we compare the behavior of these contending judges during vacancy periods with the behavior of contending judges outside vacancy periods. The data show that judges who are contending for elevation are much more likely to vote consistent with the president's preferences during vacancy periods, to write concurring opinions, to write majority opinions, and to engage in strategic publishing and per curiam decisions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: Nomination, circuit court, elevation, strategic behaviorworking papers series
Date posted: July 7, 2012
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