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The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: A Regression Discontinuity Design Approach


Alan D. Crane


Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business

Sebastien Michenaud


Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business

James Weston


Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business

December 13, 2012


Abstract:     
We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends and repurchase more shares. Our identification strategy relies on a discontinuity in ownership based on the annual composition of the Russell 1,000 and 2,000 indices. We also find evidence of a causal effect on proxy voting, corporate investment, R&D, and equity issuance. Overall, results support agency models where concentrated ownership lowers the marginal cost of delegated monitoring.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Payout, Institutional Investors, Dividends, Share Repurchases, Regression Discontinuity Design

JEL Classification: G35, G32, G30

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Date posted: July 9, 2012 ; Last revised: December 15, 2012

Suggested Citation

Crane, Alan D., Michenaud, Sebastien and Weston, James Peter, The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: A Regression Discontinuity Design Approach (December 13, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2102822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2102822

Contact Information

Alan D. Crane (Contact Author)
Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business ( email )
6100 South Main Street
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States
Sebastien Michenaud
Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business ( email )
6100 South Main Street
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States
713-348-5935 (Phone)
713-348-6331 (Fax)
James Peter Weston
Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business ( email )
6100 South Main Street
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77005
United States
713-348-4480 (Phone)
713-348-6331 (Fax)
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