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RAND Patents and Exclusion Orders: Submission of 19 Economics and Law Professors to the International Trade CommissionColleen V. ChienSanta Clara University - School of Law Richard GilbertUniversity of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics Carl ShapiroUniversity of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business Thomas F. CotterUniversity of Minnesota Law School Stefania FuscoStanford Law School; University of Pittsburgh School of Law Shubha GhoshUniversity of Wisconsin Law School Eric GoldmanSanta Clara University - School of Law Dan L. BurkUniversity of California, Irvine School of Law Daniel R. CahoyPennsylvania State University - Mary Jean and Frank P. Smeal College of Business Administration Michael A. CarrierRutgers University School of Law - Camden Jorge L. ContrerasAmerican University - Washington College of Law Joseph Scott MillerUniversity of Georgia Law School Michael RischVillanova University School of Law Jason SchultzUniversity of California, Berkeley - School of Law Ted M. SichelmanUniversity of San Diego School of Law Arti K. RaiDuke University School of Law Katherine J. StrandburgNew York University School of Law Esther Van ZimmerenUniversity of Leuven Christal SheppardUniversity of Nebraska - College of Law July 9, 2012 Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-12 UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2102865 Abstract: In this comment to ITC Investigation 337-TA-745 (Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Motorola v. Apple) we, as teachers and scholars of economics, antitrust and intellectual property, remedies, administrative, and international intellectual property law, former Department of Justice lawyers and chief economists, a former executive official at the Patent and Trademark Office, a former counsel at the ITC Office of the General Counsel, and a former Member of the President’s Council of Economic Adviser take the position that ITC exclusion orders generally should not be granted under § 1337(d)(1) on the basis of patents subject to obligations to license on “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) terms. Doing so would undermine the significant pro-competitive and pro-consumer benefits that RAND promises produce and the investments they enable. A possible exception may arise if district court jurisdiction is lacking, the patent is valid and infringed, and the public interest favors issuing an exclusion order. We explain our position in the comment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: July 10, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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