Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103250
 


 



Class Actions and State Authority


Samuel Issacharoff


New York University School of Law

July 1, 2012

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 44, 2012
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-33

Abstract:     
As experiments with class actions spread to more distant shores, especially in countries of civil law backgrounds, a recurring question arises. What is the relation of the private class action to the customary regulatory power of the state? The response offered here is that in fact the class action stands in three different postures to state authority: as a direct challenge, as a complement, and as a rival. Recent class action cases in the U.S. are analyzed to examine these three functions and to give a distinct justification for each. At bottom, each justification turns on a contested commitment to a diversity of regulatory authority – here termed “regulatory pluralism” – that lends coherence to all three forms of interaction between the state and private authority claiming the mantle of the “private attorney general.”

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

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Date posted: July 10, 2012 ; Last revised: December 8, 2012

Suggested Citation

Issacharoff, Samuel, Class Actions and State Authority (July 1, 2012). Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 44, 2012; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-33. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103250

Contact Information

Samuel Issacharoff (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6580 (Phone)
212-995-3150 (Fax)
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