Corporate Governance and Insider Trading
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Nanyang Business School
KAIST Graduate School of Finance
July 11, 2012
This paper examines the role of corporate governance in limiting insiders’ ability to profit from their information advantage. Using the governance score compiled by Institutional Shareholder Services as a measure of the effectiveness of a firm’s governance, we find that compared to insiders of poorer-governed firms, those of better-governed firms earn significantly smaller abnormal profits from their sale transactions, but not from their purchase transactions. Among various governance attributes, board effectiveness and audit quality play the most important role in reducing the profitability of insider sales. We also find that these asymmetric effects of governance on the profitability of insider trading come from two possible channels: better monitoring and more effective compensation structure. Furthermore, good governance restricts insiders’ use of private information, but not of public information, and the market interprets insider sales in better-governed firms as containing less private information than those in poorer-governed firms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 58
Keywords: corporate governance, insider trading, insider sales, insider purchases, profitability of insider trading
JEL Classification: G34, J33, K31, M52working papers series
Date posted: July 11, 2012
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