|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
A Theory of State CensorshipMehdi ShadmehrUniversity of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics Dan BernhardtUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics 2012 APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper Abstract: We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey public information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (1) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium calculations ignore that censoring less causes citizens to update more positively following no news; (2) a ruler gains from higher censorship costs if and only if censorship costs exceed a critical threshold; (3) a bad ruler prefers a very active media to a very passive one, while a good ruler prefers the opposite.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30 Keywords: Censorship, Media, Freedom of Press, Dictatorship, Revolution, Protest, Communication Technology, Internet working papers seriesDate posted: July 13, 2012 ; Last revised: July 29, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.500 seconds
