Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2106788
 
 

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Lobbying and Uniform Disclosure Regulation


Henry L. Friedman


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area

Mirko Stanislav Heinle


University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

March 7, 2016

Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms who can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free-rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this trade-off, an institutional commitment to uniformity is socially desirable when firms are sufficiently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to society are large. We show that regulatory intensity for a given firm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard-setting institutions and their effects on corporate governance and lobbying efforts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Disclosure, Regulation, Lobbying

JEL Classification: D72, G38, L51, M40, M41


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Date posted: July 15, 2012 ; Last revised: March 10, 2016

Suggested Citation

Friedman, Henry L. and Heinle, Mirko Stanislav, Lobbying and Uniform Disclosure Regulation (March 7, 2016). Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2106788 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2106788

Contact Information

Henry L. Friedman
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area ( email )
D416 Anderson Complex
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
Mirko Stanislav Heinle (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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