Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=211
 
 

References (13)



 
 

Citations (5)



 
 

Footnotes (37)



 


 



Optimal Penalties for Concealment of Crime


Timothy James Stanley


Stanford University - School of Engineering

June 1995


Abstract:     
Society should give criminals incentives not to conceal their criminal activity. The concealment costs themselves are a social waste, as are other costs the concealment may impose on society, such as additional harm or increased law enforcement expenditures. I show that for any set of sanctions that lead to positive concealment on behalf of the criminal, that society can modify the sanctions to give the criminal an incentive not to conceal and unambiguously improve social welfare. A similar conclusion will apply to increasing the costs of concealment devices to improve social welfare. Society can deter concealment of crime by raising the sanction or raising the cost of concealing the crime. Which policy is chosen should depend upon the concealment device involved. If it is easy to detect the use of a concealment device when a person is caught, then penalties should be imposed on the criminal for using such a concealment device. If the device is of the type that has no legitimate purpose other than being used for concealment, then the device should be heavily taxed or be outlawed. For situations where we are unable to determine whether the device has been used to conceal and the device has legitimate purpose, society should set one penalty for the crime, and possibly a generalized additional sanction for any concealment of the crime that can be determined.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

JEL Classification: K14

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 19, 1995  

Suggested Citation

Stanley, Timothy James, Optimal Penalties for Concealment of Crime (June 1995). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=211 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.211

Contact Information

Timothy James Stanley (Contact Author)
Stanford University - School of Engineering ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305-9025
United States
415-322-2783 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,433
Downloads: 181
Download Rank: 96,342
References:  13
Citations:  5
Footnotes:  37

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.328 seconds