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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111895
 
 

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The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination


Michael Keen


International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Kai A. Konrad


Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

July 9, 2014

Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2012-06

Abstract:     
This chapter surveys the theory of international tax competition and coordination, which, matching the increasing policy importance of the topic, has grown substantially over the last thirty years. It focuses on the taxation of capital income, stressing that issues arise not only in relation to movements of productive capital – the primary concern in the earliest literature – but also in relation to the shifting of paper profits. It sets out, assesses, and uses as a unifying framework, the two workhorse models in the area. After discussing the welfare properties and comparative statics of non-cooperative equilibria under unconstrained tax competition, the chapter analyses key issues of coordination (within subsets of countries, for instance) and a range of specific topics (such as the nature and impact of tax havens).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 72

Keywords: International taxation, tax competition

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Date posted: July 18, 2012 ; Last revised: July 9, 2014

Suggested Citation

Keen, Michael and Konrad, Kai A., The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination (July 9, 2014). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2012-06 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2111895

Contact Information

Michael Keen (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department ( email )
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom
Kai A. Konrad
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )
Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany
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