The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
Kai A. Konrad
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
July 13, 2012
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2012-06
This paper surveys the theory of international tax competition and coordination, which, matching the increasing policy importance of the topic, has grown substantially over the last thirty years. It focuses on the taxation of capital income, stressing that issues arise not only in relation to movements of productive capital – the primary concern in the earliest literature – but also in relation to the shifting of paper profits. It sets out, assesses, and uses as a unifying framework, the two workhorse models in the area. After discussing the welfare properties and comparative statics of non-cooperative equilibria under unconstrained tax competition, the paper analyses key issues of coordination (within subsets of countries, for instance) and a range of specific topics (such as the nature and impact of tax havens).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 85
Keywords: International taxation, tax competitionworking papers series
Date posted: July 18, 2012 ; Last revised: January 24, 2013
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