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Exchange Rate Policy and Sovereign Bond Spreads in Developing Countries


Samir Jahjah


International Monetary Fund - INS

Vivian Zhanwei Yue


Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Bin Wei


Federal Reserve Board

June 12, 2012

FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1049

Abstract:     
This paper empirically analyzes how exchange rate policy affects the issuance and pricing of international bonds for developing countries. We find that countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes pay higher sovereign bond spreads and are less likely to issue bonds. Quantitatively, changing a free-floating regime to a fixed regime decreases the likelihood of bond issuance by 4.6% and increases the bond spread by 1.3% on average. Furthermore, countries with real exchange rate overvaluation have higher bond spreads and higher bond issuance probabilities. Moreover, such positive effects of real exchange rate overvaluation tend to be magnified for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. Our results suggest that choosing a less flexible exchange rate regime in general leads to higher borrowing costs for developing countries, especially when their currencies are overvalued.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Sovereign Bond Spread, Exchange Rate Regime, Overvaluation, Debt Crisis

JEL Classification: E58, F31, F33, F34

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Date posted: July 19, 2012 ; Last revised: July 23, 2012

Suggested Citation

Jahjah, Samir, Yue, Vivian Zhanwei and Wei, Bin, Exchange Rate Policy and Sovereign Bond Spreads in Developing Countries (June 12, 2012). FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1049. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111999 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2111999

Contact Information

Samir Jahjah
International Monetary Fund - INS ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-3682 (Phone)
202-589-6823 (Fax)
Vivian Zhanwei Yue (Contact Author)
Federal Reserve Board of Governors ( email )
20th St. and Constitution Ave.
Washington, DC 20551
United States
Bin Wei
Federal Reserve Board ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
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