Interpreting Tort Law
Emily L. Sherwin
Cornell University - Law School
July 23, 2012
Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2011
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-53
This article is a comment on Goldberg and Zipursky’s civil recourse theory of tort law. Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory is a masterful project, the best of its kind. Nevertheles, I offer two criticisms. The first is that, ultimately, civil recourse reflects the need for a peaceful alternative to private revenge - a feature of social life that may be inevitable but is not particularly laudable. The second point expresses my own skepticism about interpretation of fields of law. Doctrinal categories such as Tort Law are accretions of common law and statutory rules, helpfully but artificially grouped together. I see no reason to expect such categories to embody overarching moral principles peculiar to the field. At best, theorists can adduce legal principles, which are neither legal rules nor moral principles but an odd sort of hybrid.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: Tort, Civil RecourseAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 24, 2012
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