Nuclear Proliferation and the Risk of Nuclear Conflict: An Experimental Approach
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
June 1, 2012
MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2012-20
The causes and prevention of nuclear war are critical to human survival but difficult to study empirically, as observations of nuclear war do not exist in the real world. Research on nuclear war has remained exclusively theoretical as a consequence. To circumvent the observational constraint, I examine the relationship between the number of nuclear actors and the risk of nuclear conflict using nuclear-option games that experimentally manipulate the number of players (N) with a nuclear option in a laboratory setting. Results show that decisions are mostly peaceful in the dyadic condition (N = 2) despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage. However, a jump in the number of nuclear actors in the crisis interaction causes a significant increase in the individual propensity to use the nuclear option. The findings highlight an avenue of research that evaluates theoretical mechanisms of nuclear war experimentally, moving existing research beyond the theoretical domain.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38working papers series
Date posted: July 27, 2012 ; Last revised: December 20, 2013
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