Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117942
 
 

References (62)



 
 

Citations (11)



 


 



Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms


Richard Makadok


Emory University - Department of Organization & Management

Russell Wayne Coff


University of Wisconsin - Madison - School of Business

July 26, 2009

Academy of Management Review (34), 297-319

Abstract:     
We create a taxonomy of hybrid governance forms and develop a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multitask principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership, and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help us understand and predict hybrid governance forms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

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Date posted: July 28, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Makadok, Richard and Coff, Russell Wayne, Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms (July 26, 2009). Academy of Management Review (34), 297-319. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117942

Contact Information

Richard Makadok
Emory University - Department of Organization & Management ( email )
1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
727-8639 (Phone)
727-6313 (Fax)
Russell Wayne Coff (Contact Author)
University of Wisconsin - Madison - School of Business ( email )
975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States
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References:  62
Citations:  11

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