Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms
Emory University - Department of Organization & Management
Russell Wayne Coff
University of Wisconsin - Madison - School of Business
July 26, 2009
Academy of Management Review (34), 297-319
We create a taxonomy of hybrid governance forms and develop a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multitask principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership, and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help us understand and predict hybrid governance forms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Date posted: July 28, 2012
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