Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2118918
 


 



Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets


Jonathan Barnett


USC Gould School of Law

March 5, 2014

Duke Law Journal, Forthcoming
USC Law and Economics Research Papers Series No. C12-9
USC Legal Studies Research Papers Series No. 12-15

Abstract:     
Hollywood film studios, talent and other deal participants regularly commit to, and undertake production of, high-stakes film projects on the basis of unsigned “deal memos,” informal communications or draft agreements whose legal enforceability is uncertain. These “soft contracts” constitute a hybrid instrument that addresses a challenging transactional environment where neither formal contract nor reputation effects adequately protect parties against the holdup risk and project risk inherent to a film project. Parties negotiate the degree of contractual formality, which correlates with legal enforceability, as a proxy for allocating these risks at a transaction-cost savings relative to a fully formalized and specified instrument. Uncertainly enforceable contracts embed an implicit termination option that provides some protection against project risk while maintaining a threat of legal liability that provides some protection against holdup risk. Historical evidence suggests that soft contracts substitute for the vertically integrated structures that allocated these risks in the “studio system” era.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

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Date posted: July 29, 2012 ; Last revised: March 5, 2014

Suggested Citation

Barnett, Jonathan, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets (March 5, 2014). Duke Law Journal, Forthcoming; USC Law and Economics Research Papers Series No. C12-9; USC Legal Studies Research Papers Series No. 12-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2118918 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2118918

Contact Information

Jonathan Barnett (Contact Author)
USC Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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