Abstract

 


 



SAA II: Abuse of Dominance in the South African Skies


Giulio Federico


Chief Economist Team, DG Competition, European Commission; University of Navarra, IESE Business School

June 2012


Abstract:     
This article reviews a recent abuse of dominance decision against the incumbent domestic airline in South Africa (SAA). This case placed significant emphasis on the economic impact of the abusive conduct, and it represents a clear example of the adoption of an effects-based approach to assess exclusionary behavior by a dominant firm. As this paper sets out, given the features of SAA’s conduct and of the relevant market context, it is also possible to identify a coherent economic framework which can explain why SAA’s rivals could not profitably match its incentive schemes and were therefore foreclosed. The conceptual issues raised by the SAA case are similar to the ones at stake in the landmark judgments on British Airways. The lessons from this case are therefore relevant to ongoing antitrust debate on loyalty discounts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: abuse of dominance, loyalty schemes, foreclosure

JEL Classification: L41

working papers series


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Date posted: July 29, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Federico, Giulio, SAA II: Abuse of Dominance in the South African Skies (June 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2119495 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2119495

Contact Information

Giulio Federico (Contact Author)
Chief Economist Team, DG Competition, European Commission ( email ) ( email )
University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email ) ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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