Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2119659
 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



An Economic Response to Unsolicited Communication


Thede C. Loder


University of Michigan - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Marshall W. Van Alstyne


Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School

Rick Wash


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - School of Information

August 15, 2005

TPRC 2005

Abstract:     
We investigate welfare effects of mechanisms designed to improve total communications value. Identifying first contact information asymmetry and negative externalities as the critical problems, we analyze best-in-class solutions from law, technology, and economics. Comparison leads to several useful conclusions. First, mechanisms designed to promote valuable communication can outperform those designed to block wasteful communication. The best mechanism can, on occasion, outperform even a “perfect filter.” Second, it is advantageous to shift focus from message content to senders’ private knowledge. Recipients can then use information revelation mechanisms to force people who knowingly misuse communication to drop out or incur higher costs. Third, private knowledge of message value and the choice to communicate might favor senders over receivers. These advantages disappear, however, under a take-it-or-leave-it offer by recipients to refuse non-conforming communications. Fourth, giving recipients rights in their own attention can improve willingness to signal their preferences, which facilitates efficient sender targeting.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

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Date posted: July 30, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Loder, Thede C. and Van Alstyne, Marshall W. and Wash, Rick, An Economic Response to Unsolicited Communication (August 15, 2005). TPRC 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2119659

Contact Information

Thede C. Loder (Contact Author)
University of Michigan - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science ( email )
1101 Beal Avenue
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
415-420-8615 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.loder.com
Marshall W. Van Alstyne
Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-3571 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://smgapps.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School ( email )
Center for Digital Business
5 Cambridge Center - NE25, 7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0768 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/home.html
Richard Wash
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - School of Information ( email )
304 West Hall
550 East University
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1092
United States
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