Abstract

 


 



Invisible Cities in Europe


Fernanda Nicola


American University - Washington College of Law

July 30, 2012

35 Fordham International Law Journal 1282 (2012)
American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2012-27

Abstract:     
Cities in Europe control municipal services, varying from education, public health, waste management and housing policies, that at times clash with European Union rules regulating the functioning of the Internal Market. For this reason, cities are often actors in judicial proceedings before the European courts. The Lisbon Treaty has revived the judiciability of the subsidiarity principle by giving new powers to subnational actors to participate in the formation of EU law. Yet even though policy-makers promote local participation and democracy, judges, in striking down or upholding local welfare policies that conflict with Internal Market rules, have rendered cities invisible. In balancing conflicting EU versus Member States interests as two autonomous and independent spheres of power, European judges rely on a fiction of non-intervention in state-local matters. In their decisions, city interests are either subsumed into State or EU goals, or they are reduced to private market actors. Cities have traditionally been seats of civilization and flourishing of an integrated Europe but with the Internal Market, they have necessarily taken a back seat. To redress the balance, judges should address the fact that what is decided in Luxembourg inevitably affects the redistribution of power and resources in state-local relations. By exposing the interdependence between the powers of the Union, its Member States and the plurality of cities that constitute them, such process will create greater democratic accountability in the Internal Market jurisprudence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 83

Keywords: cities, European Union, international law

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Date posted: July 30, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Nicola, Fernanda Giorgia, Invisible Cities in Europe (July 30, 2012). 35 Fordham International Law Journal 1282 (2012); American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2012-27. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120163

Contact Information

Fernanda Giorgia Nicola (Contact Author)
American University - Washington College of Law ( email )
4801 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
United States
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