Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120890
 
 

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International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

Alan O. Sykes


Stanford University - Law School

July 31, 2012

University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 609
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 396
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 431

Abstract:     
The macroeconomic policies of states can produce significant costs and benefits for other states, yet international macroeconomic cooperation has been one of the weakest areas of international law. We ask why states have had such trouble cooperating over macroeconomic issues, when they have been relatively successful at cooperation over other economic matters such as international trade. We argue that although the theoretical benefits of macroeconomic cooperation are real, in practice it is difficult to sustain because optimal cooperative policies are often uncertain and time variant, making it exceedingly difficult to craft clear rules for cooperation in many areas. It is also often difficult or impossible to design credible self-enforcement mechanisms. Recent cooperation on bank capital standards, the history of exchange rate cooperation, the European monetary union, and the prospects for broader monetary and fiscal cooperation are all discussed. We contrast the reasons for successful cooperation on international trade policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53


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Date posted: July 31, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A. and Sykes, Alan O., International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation (July 31, 2012). University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 609; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 396; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 431. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120890 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2120890

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
Alan O'Neil Sykes
Stanford University - Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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