Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes
University of Arizona
University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law
Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Forthcoming
Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 12-24
Antitrust refusal to deal, essential facility, and price squeeze claims, and the doctrines that accommodate such claims are analytically peculiar. First, the claims seek to establish duties to deal — mandates — even with competitors, while antitrust is designed to restrict anticompetitive collaborations, not to enforce cooperation. Second, the claims are strongly associated with fairness perceptions and at least implicitly stress competitive unfairness, whereas their primary justification is market efficiency. Third, both fairness and efficiency may be desirable goals for public policies, but antitrust laws do not offer a regulatory framework to advance such goals through duties to deal. Forth, the claims and judicial rules that accommodate them have the intuitive appeal of rules of thumb, but they are too simplistic to address many common economic settings. This Chapter offers a general framework for the analysis of refusal to deal, essential facility, and price squeeze claims, or more broadly, alleged antitrust duties to deal.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: Antitrust, Refusal to Deal, Essential Facility, Price Squeezes, Group Boycott, Duty to Deal
JEL Classification: K21, L40, L41, L42, L51Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 1, 2012 ; Last revised: August 9, 2012
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