Robust Exclusion through Loyalty Discounts with Buyer Commitment
Harvard Law School
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law; University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics
August 1, 2012
Harvard Discussion Paper No. 722
U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 240
We show that loyalty discounts with buyer commitments create anticompetitive effects beyond those possible with pure exclusive dealing. The loyalty discount adds a seller commitment to maintain a distinction between the loyal and disloyal price. This seller commitment reduces the seller's incentives to compete for free buyers because the loyalty discount means that lowering prices to free buyers requires lowering prices to committed buyers. This softened seller competition reduces the rival's incentive to lower its own prices to free buyers. The result is inflated prices to free buyers, which in turn inflates prices to committed buyers because they are priced at a loyalty discount from those free buyer prices. Because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract thus softens competition and raises prices for all buyers, the result is to create an externality among buyers even without economies of scale or downstream competition. If enough buyers exist and the entrant's cost advantage is not too large, we prove that this externality means that: (1) in any equilibrium, enough buyers sign loyalty discount contracts to anticompetitively increase prices; and (2) there always exists a possible equilibrium in which all buyers sign, completely foreclosing a more efficient rival. As a result, the incumbent can use loyalty discounts to increase its profit and decrease both buyer and total welfare.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
JEL Classification: C72, K0, K21, L12, L40, L41, L42
Date posted: August 7, 2012
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.297 seconds