Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126192
 
 

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Product Market Competition, Managerial Compensation and Firm Size in Market Equilibrium


Ajay Subramanian


Georgia State University

August 7, 2012

Management Science, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We develop a tractable equilibrium model of competing firms in an industry to show how the distribution of firm qualities, moral hazard, and product market characteristics interact to affect firm size, managerial compensation, and market structure. Equilibrium effects cause different determinants of product market competition -- the entry cost and the elasticity of substitution -- to have sharply contrasting effects on firm size and managerial compensation. While both firm size and managerial compensation increase with the entry cost, they increase with the elasticity of substitution if and only if firm size exceeds a high threshold, but decrease if it is below a low threshold. We also show how the distribution of firms' productivity shocks affects firm size, managerial compensation, and market structure. Aggregate shocks to the firm productivity distribution affect incentives in our equilibrium framework. We develop and test a number of qualitative hypotheses that relate product market/industry characteristics to CEO compensation, firm size, and the number of firms in the industry. We show statistically and economically significant empirical support for all the hypotheses. In particular, different determinants of product market competition indeed have sharply contrasting effects on managerial compensation, firm size, and the number of firms as predicted by the theory.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Product Market Competition, Managerial Compensation, Firm Size, Market Equilibrium

JEL Classification: D43, D50, G30, L11, L13

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Date posted: August 8, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Subramanian, Ajay, Product Market Competition, Managerial Compensation and Firm Size in Market Equilibrium (August 7, 2012). Management Science, Forthcoming . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126192

Contact Information

Ajay Subramanian (Contact Author)
Georgia State University ( email )
Department of Risk Management and Insurance
P.O. Box 4050
Atlanta, GA 30303
United States
404-413-7483 (Phone)
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