Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Structure and Computation of Optimal Policies

Omar Besbes

Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations

Ilan Lobel

New York University (NYU)

November 8, 2013

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/46

We consider the question of how should a firm optimally set a sequence of prices in order to maximize its long-term average revenue given a continuous flow of strategic customers. In particular, customers arrive over time, are strategic in timing their purchases and are heterogeneous along two dimensions: their valuation for the firm's product and their willingness to wait before purchasing or leaving. The customers' patience and valuation may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. For this general formulation, we prove that the firm may restrict attention to cyclic pricing policies, which have length at most twice the maximum willingness to wait of the customer population. To efficiently compute optimal policies, we develop a dynamic programming approach which uses a novel state space which is general, enabling to handle arbitrary problem primitives, and that generalizes to finite horizon problems with non-stationary parameters. We analyze the class of monotone pricing policies and establish their suboptimality in general. Optimal policies are, in a typical scenario, characterized by nested sales, where the firm offers partial discounts throughout each cycle, offers a significant discount halfway through the cycle, with the largest discount offered at the end of the cycle. We further establish a form of equivalence between the problem of pricing for a stream of heterogeneous strategic customers and pricing for a pool of heterogeneous customers who may stockpile units of the product.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: pricing, optimization, intertemporal pricing, price discrimination, strategic consumers, stockpiling

working papers series

Download This Paper

Date posted: August 8, 2012 ; Last revised: November 9, 2013

Suggested Citation

Besbes, Omar and Lobel, Ilan, Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Structure and Computation of Optimal Policies (November 8, 2013). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/46. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126312 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2126312

Contact Information

Omar Besbes (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations ( email )
New York, NY
United States

Ilan Lobel
New York University (NYU) ( email )
Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
20 Cooper Square 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10003-711
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,318
Downloads: 233
Download Rank: 78,111

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.421 seconds