Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126794
 


 



Overbilling and Informed Financial Consent -- A Contractual Solution


Barak D. Richman


Duke University - School of Law

Mark A. Hall


Wake Forest University - School of Law

Kevin A. Schulman


Duke University Medical Center

August 2, 2012

New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 476, No. 5, p. 396, August 2012

Abstract:     
U.S. hospitals and physicians regularly charge uninsured patients and patients receiving care outside their health-plan networks far more what most health insurers pay and far more than their actual costs. Such practices have triggered over 100 lawsuits and prompted calls for pricing transparency in Congress and price regulation in several states. This Perspective argues that the theory of implied contracts, a foundation in most first-year courses in contract law, offers a useful legal and ethical mechanism for handling these troubling problems in health care billing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 2

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Date posted: August 9, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Richman, Barak D. and Hall, Mark A. and Schulman, Kevin A., Overbilling and Informed Financial Consent -- A Contractual Solution (August 2, 2012). New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 476, No. 5, p. 396, August 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126794

Contact Information

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
Mark A. Hall
Wake Forest University - School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
336-716-9807 (Phone)

Kevin A. Schulman
Duke University Medical Center ( email )
Durham, NC 27715
United States
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