Abstract

 
 

References (53)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Excessive Bank Risk Taking and Monetary Policy


Itai Agur


IMF Singapore Regional Training Institute

Maria Demertzis


De Nederlandsche Bank - Research Department

August 13, 2012

ECB Working Paper No. 1457

Abstract:     
Why should monetary policy 'lean against the wind'? Can’t bank regulation perform its task alone? We model banks that choose both asset volatility and leverage, and identify how monetary policy transmits to bank risk. Subsequently, we introduce a regulator whose tool is a risk-based capital requirement. We derive from welfare that the regulator trades off bank risk and credit supply, and show that monetary policy affects both sides of this trade-off. Hence, regulation cannot neutralize the policy rate’s impact, and monetary policy matters for financial stability. An extension shows how the commonality of bank exposures affects monetary transmission.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: macroprudential, leverage, supervision, monetary transmission

JEL Classification: E43, E52, E61, G01, G21, G28

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Agur, Itai and Demertzis, Maria, Excessive Bank Risk Taking and Monetary Policy (August 13, 2012). ECB Working Paper No. 1457. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128478

Contact Information

Itai Agur (Contact Author)
IMF Singapore Regional Training Institute ( email )
700 19 th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
+65 64299103 (Phone)
Maria Demertzis
De Nederlandsche Bank - Research Department ( email )
P.O. Box 98
1000 AB Amsterdam
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www1.fee.uva.nl/toe/content/people/demertzis.shtm

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 243
Downloads: 60
Download Rank: 183,703
References:  53
Citations:  7

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.312 seconds