|
||||
|
||||
Excessive Bank Risk Taking and Monetary PolicyItai AgurIMF Singapore Regional Training Institute Maria DemertzisDe Nederlandsche Bank - Research Department August 13, 2012 ECB Working Paper No. 1457 Abstract: Why should monetary policy 'lean against the wind'? Can’t bank regulation perform its task alone? We model banks that choose both asset volatility and leverage, and identify how monetary policy transmits to bank risk. Subsequently, we introduce a regulator whose tool is a risk-based capital requirement. We derive from welfare that the regulator trades off bank risk and credit supply, and show that monetary policy affects both sides of this trade-off. Hence, regulation cannot neutralize the policy rate’s impact, and monetary policy matters for financial stability. An extension shows how the commonality of bank exposures affects monetary transmission.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34 Keywords: macroprudential, leverage, supervision, monetary transmission JEL Classification: E43, E52, E61, G01, G21, G28 working papers seriesDate posted: August 20, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.312 seconds