Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128806
 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Empirically Informed Regulation


Cass R. Sunstein


Harvard Law School

2011

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2011
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 13-03

Abstract:     
In recent years, social scientists have been incorporating empirical findings about human behavior into economic models. These findings offer important insights for thinking about regulation and its likely consequences. They also offer some suggestions about the appropriate design of effective, low-cost, choice-preserving approaches to regulatory problems, including disclosure requirements, default rules, and simplification. A general lesson is that small, inexpensive policy initiatives can have large and highly beneficial effects. In the United States, a large number of recent practices and reforms reflect an appreciation of this lesson. They also reflect an understanding of the need to ensure that regulations have strong empirical foundations, both through careful analysis of costs and benefits in advance and through retrospective review of what works and what does not.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 78

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Date posted: August 13, 2012 ; Last revised: February 14, 2013

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R., Empirically Informed Regulation (2011). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2011; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 13-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128806

Contact Information

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)
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