Supply Chain Sustainability: Evidence on Conflict Minerals

Posted: 17 Aug 2012 Last revised: 15 May 2014

See all articles by Paul A. Griffin

Paul A. Griffin

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management

David H. Lont

University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance

Estelle Sun

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Date Written: August 11, 2013

Abstract

This study tests hypotheses about the expected economic cost of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Reform Act of 2010. We find that shareholder value decreases for companies with conflict minerals disclosures (discloser companies) for up to three weeks following the event dates of the discloser companies. Shareholder value also decreases, but to a lesser degree, for a control sample of non-discloser companies expected to disclose in the future. We estimate an aggregate loss of shareholder value for these companies of $6.5 to $13.1 billion. These results have implications for corporate social justice, for they show that legislators’ and stakeholders’ demands for increased social transparency can be costly to shareholders when the disclosure rules induce changes in management and customer decision making.

Keywords: Supply chain sustainability, Conflict minerals, Dodd-Frank Reform Act, Section 1502, Off-balance sheet assets and liabilities

JEL Classification: G14, M41, M48, K22, Q51, Q56

Suggested Citation

Griffin, Paul A. and Lont, David H. and Sun, Estelle Yuan, Supply Chain Sustainability: Evidence on Conflict Minerals (August 11, 2013). Pacific Accounting Review DOI: 10.1108/PAR-04-2013-0023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2129371 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2129371

Paul A. Griffin (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management ( email )

3102 Gallahger Hall
Davis, CA 95616
United States
(530) 752-7372 (Phone)
(425) 799-4143 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsm.ucdavis.edu/griffin/

David H. Lont

University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance ( email )

Box 56
Dunedin, Otago 9054
New Zealand
+64 3 479 8119 (Phone)
+64 3 479 8171 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/acty/

Estelle Yuan Sun

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States
1-617-353-2353 (Phone)

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