Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129805
 
 

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Competition and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Deregulation in the Banking Industry


Jeffrey J. Burks


University of Notre Dame

Christine Cuny


New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Joseph J. Gerakos


Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College

Joao Granja


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

February 23, 2016

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-29

Abstract:     
We use the relaxation of interstate branching restrictions under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how increases in competition affect incumbents' voluntary disclosure choices. States implemented the IBBEA over several years and to varying degrees, allowing us to identify the effect of increased competition on the voluntary disclosure decisions of both public and private banks. We find that increases in competition are associated with increases in the level of voluntary disclosure. Specifically, we find an overall increase in press releases. Consistent with heightened incentives to communicate with investors, customers, and regulators, we document an increase in press releases containing forward-looking, product-related, and capital structure-related disclosures. Consistent with heightened incentives to communicate with competitors, we find that the tone of press releases becomes more negative after entry barriers are lowered.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, Competition, Banking

JEL Classification: M41, G21, D40


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Date posted: August 16, 2012 ; Last revised: February 24, 2016

Suggested Citation

Burks, Jeffrey J. and Cuny, Christine and Gerakos, Joseph J. and Granja, Joao, Competition and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Deregulation in the Banking Industry (February 23, 2016). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2129805

Contact Information

Jeffrey J. Burks
University of Notre Dame ( email )
Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States
Christine Cuny (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
Ste. 10-91
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
212-998-0423 (Phone)

Joseph J. Gerakos
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
Joao Granja
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Room 326
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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