Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129805
 


 



Competition and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Deregulation in the Banking Industry


Jeffrey J. Burks


University of Notre Dame

Christine Cuny


New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Joseph Gerakos


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Joao Granja


MIT - Sloan School of Management

October 24, 2013

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-29

Abstract:     
We use the relaxation of interstate branching restrictions under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how increases in competition affect incumbents' voluntary disclosure choices. States implemented IBBEA over several years and to varying degrees, allowing us to identify the effect of increased competition on the voluntary disclosure decisions of both public and private banks. We find that increases in competition are associated with increases in the level of voluntary disclosure. Specifically, we find an overall increase in press releases and, in particular, an increase in those containing forward-looking, earnings-related, and capital structure-related disclosures. Consistent with incumbents increasing the disclosure of bad news to deter new entry, the tone of press releases becomes less positive and more negative after entry barriers are lowered.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 16, 2012 ; Last revised: October 26, 2013

Suggested Citation

Burks, Jeffrey J. and Cuny, Christine and Gerakos, Joseph and Granja, Joao, Competition and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Deregulation in the Banking Industry (October 24, 2013). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2129805

Contact Information

Jeffrey J. Burks
University of Notre Dame ( email )
Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States
Christine Cuny (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
Ste. 10-91
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
212-998-0423 (Phone)
Joseph J. Gerakos
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Ave.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-6882 (Phone)
Joao Granja
MIT - Sloan School of Management ( email )
100 Main Street, E62-685
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,970
Downloads: 467
Download Rank: 33,166

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.375 seconds