Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130858
 


 



Can the Right to Be Heard Be Respected Without Access to Information About the Proceedings? Deficiencies of National Competition Procedure


Maciej Bernatt


University of Warsaw, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies; Loyola University of Chicago - Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies

August 16, 2012

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, p. 91, 2012

Abstract:     
This article analyses Polish competition procedure from the perspective of a) the right to be heard, and b) the right to receive information about the proceedings. It points out problems with access to information about competition proceedings which influence the level of protection of the right to be heard in these proceedings. In order to appraise this issue, the article embarks upon an examination of the rules governing the right to be heard in Polish competition enforcement proceedings. It then focuses on the extent of the competition authority’s obligation to inform undertakings about the actions addressed to them. The article includes discussion of the rules that circumscribe the parties’ right of access to evidence in the proceedings. Finally, proposals for changes in the practice of the competition authority, as well as in the Polish legal framework, are put forth. The new rules governing competition proceedings before the European Commission serve as an example for improvements in Polish competition procedures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: competition proceedings, antitrust proceedings, competition authority, right to be heard, due process, right to fair hearing, procedural fairness, fundamental rights

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Date posted: August 17, 2012 ; Last revised: October 29, 2012

Suggested Citation

Bernatt, Maciej, Can the Right to Be Heard Be Respected Without Access to Information About the Proceedings? Deficiencies of National Competition Procedure (August 16, 2012). Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, p. 91, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130858

Contact Information

Maciej Bernatt (Contact Author)
University of Warsaw, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies ( email )
Poland
HOME PAGE: http://www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl/news_gb.html
Loyola University of Chicago - Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies ( email )
1 East Pearson Street
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
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