Abstract

 


 



Social Well-Being and IP Theft: A Dynamic Economic Analysis


T. Randolph Beard


Auburn University - Department of Economics

George S. Ford


Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Lawrence J. Spiwak


Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Michael L. Stern


Auburn University; Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

March 1, 2012

Phoenix Center Policy Bulletin No. 32

Abstract:     
One of the most vexing issues of late is how to develop an effective yet socially-acceptable policy response to stop the rampant and expanding theft of intellectual property (“IP”) using the Internet. While much of the debate is of a populist and unsophisticated nature, there are in fact some significant and legitimate philosophical disagreements surrounding IP protection. For example, since IP is typically non-rivalrous in consumption, the theft of IP may be (and has been) construed as merely a transfer — what the copyright owner loses the thief gains. Some argue, consequently, that IP theft is economically of little significance. In this paper, using a very conventional dynamic general equilibrium framework, we show that the theft of IP reduces social well-being, even if we count the benefits to the thief and assume theft requires no resources. In effect, theft acts as a distortionary tax on sellers, and this distortion is not remedied by merely returning the proceeds of the theft as a lump sum transfer to consumers. As such, as the debate moves forward on how to develop effective mechanisms to prevent IP theft, we may set aside the argument that on-line theft of IP causes no real economic harm and therefore no foul.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Intelectual Property, IP Theft, SOPA

JEL Classification: O34, O38

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 18, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Beard, T. Randolph, Ford, George S., Spiwak, Lawrence J. and Stern, Michael L., Social Well-Being and IP Theft: A Dynamic Economic Analysis (March 1, 2012). Phoenix Center Policy Bulletin No. 32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131458

Contact Information

Thomas Randolph Beard
Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )
415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States
George S. Ford
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
Lawrence J. Spiwak (Contact Author)
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
202-274-0235 (Phone)
202-318-4909 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.phoenix-center.org
Michael L. Stern
Auburn University ( email )
415 West Magnolia Avenue
Auburn, AL 36849
United States
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 151
Downloads: 23

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.625 seconds