Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131572
 


 



The Value of Bosses


Edward P. Lazear


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Kathryn L. Shaw


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christopher Stanton


University of Utah - Department of Finance; NBER

June 13, 2014


Abstract:     
How and by how much do supervisors enhance worker productivity? Using a company-based data set on the productivity of technology-based services workers, supervisor effects are estimated and found to be large. Replacing a boss who is in the lower 10% of boss quality with one who is in the upper 10% of boss quality increases a team’s total output by more than would adding one worker to a nine member team. Workers assigned to better bosses are less likely to leave the firm. A separate normalization implies that the average boss is about 1.75 times as productive as the average worker.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

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Date posted: August 18, 2012 ; Last revised: June 14, 2014

Suggested Citation

Lazear, Edward P. and Shaw, Kathryn L. and Stanton, Christopher, The Value of Bosses (June 13, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131572 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2131572

Contact Information

Edward P. Lazear
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9136 (Phone)
650-723-0498 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Kathryn L. Shaw
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Christopher Stanton (Contact Author)
University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )
David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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