Abstract

 


 



Pay for Environmental Performance: The Effect of Incentive Provision on Carbon Emissions


Robert G. Eccles


Harvard Business School

Ioannis Ioannou


London Business School

Shelley Xin Li


Harvard Business School

George Serafeim


Harvard University - Harvard Business School

August 20, 2012

AAA 2013 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper

Abstract:     
Corporations are increasingly under pressure to improve their environmental performance and to account for potential risks and opportunities associated with climate change. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of monetary and nonmonetary incentives provided by companies to their employees in order to reduce carbon emissions. Specifically, we find evidence that the use of monetary incentives is associated with higher carbon emissions. This result holds both in cross-sectional and time-series analysis. Moreover, we find that the use of nonmonetary incentives is associated with lower carbon emissions. Consistent with monetary incentives crowding out motivation for pro-social behavior, we find that the effect of monetary incentives on carbon emissions is mitigated when these incentives are provided to employees with formally assigned responsibility for environmental performance. Furthermore, by employing a two-stage multinomial logistic model, we provide insights into factors affecting companies’ decisions on incentive provision, as well as showing that the impact of monetary incentives on carbon emissions remains significant even when we control for potential selection bias in our sample.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Incentives, monetary, nonmonetary, environment, carbon emissions, pro-social

JEL Classification: M4, M5, M1

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Eccles, Robert G., Ioannou, Ioannis, Li, Shelley Xin and Serafeim, George, Pay for Environmental Performance: The Effect of Incentive Provision on Carbon Emissions (August 20, 2012). AAA 2013 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133004 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133004

Contact Information

Robert G. Eccles
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
Ioannis Ioannou
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
02070008748 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.london.edu
Xin Li (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
George Serafeim
Harvard University - Harvard Business School ( email )
381 Morgan Hall
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=15705
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,554
Downloads: 501
Download Rank: 25,427

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.390 seconds