An Analysis of the Proposed Interchange Fee Litigation Settlement
Adam J. Levitin
Georgetown University Law Center
August 21, 2012
Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-033
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 12-125
This paper is a brief analysis of the proposed class settlement in In re Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, MDL 1720 (E.D.N.Y.). The analysis concludes that the relief plaintiff class members would obtain from the proposed settlement is largely illusory. The settlement does not result in meaningful reform of the interchange fee system and appears to provide less relief than would likely result from continued litigation. In short, the settlement is a bad deal for merchant plaintiffs and the public at large.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: interchange, credit cards, merchant discount, issuer, acquirer, Visa, MasterCard, MDL 1720, settlement, surcharge, routing, honor all cards, release
JEL Classification: K41, L41, L44
Date posted: August 21, 2012 ; Last revised: September 3, 2012
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