A Model of Shadow Banking
Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research
Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Robert W. Vishny
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
April 16, 2012
Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-38
Fama-Miller Working Paper
We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry-ups when investors ignore tail risks.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 66working papers series
Date posted: August 21, 2012
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