Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133429
 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Money Doctors


Nicola Gennaioli


Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Robert W. Vishny


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 11, 2012

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-39
Fama-Miller Working Paper

Abstract:     
We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor’s perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

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Date posted: August 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Gennaioli, Nicola and Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., Money Doctors (June 11, 2012). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-39; Fama-Miller Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133429 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133429

Contact Information

Nicola Gennaioli
Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy
Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Robert W. Vishny (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-702-2522 (Phone)
312-702-0118 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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Citations:  7

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