Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133784
 


 



Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats


Michael Albertus


University of Chicago - Department of Political Science

Victor A. Menaldo


University of Washington - Department of Political Science

August 22, 2012

Forthcoming, International Studies Quarterly

Abstract:     
This paper examines how the circumstances of democratic transition affect the consequences of losing office for outgoing dictators. Using data on constitutional origins and democratization from 1875-2004, we find that outgoing dictators who are able to retain a holdover constitution through democratization and beyond are less likely to face severe punishment upon relinquishing their rule. These results hold after accounting for alternative explanations of autocrats' post-tenure fate and after using instrumental variables to adjust for potential endogeneity. We also document several mechanisms by which this occurs: proportional representation, the election of right-wing executives, post-transition military influence, and elite control over local politics. The findings suggest that for dictators who fear their ousting in the face of domestic unrest or potential instability, democracy can provide a plausible avenue for protecting their most basic interests.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

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Date posted: August 22, 2012 ; Last revised: August 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Albertus, Michael and Menaldo, Victor A., Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats (August 22, 2012). Forthcoming, International Studies Quarterly. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133784 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133784

Contact Information

Michael Albertus
University of Chicago - Department of Political Science ( email )
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Victor A. Menaldo (Contact Author)
University of Washington - Department of Political Science ( email )
101 Gowen Hall
Box 353530
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
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